Microsoft Windows Security
Preventing unauthorized access to sensitive data is essential in any environment in which multiple users have access to the same physical or network resources. An operating system, as well as individual users, must be able to protect files, memory, and configuration settings from unwanted viewing and modification. Operating system security includes obvious mechanisms such as accounts, passwords, and file protection. It also includes less obvious mechanisms, such as protecting the operating system from corruption, preventing less privileged users from performing actions (rebooting the computer, for example), and not allowing user programs to adversely affect the programs of other users or the operating system.
In this chapter, we explain how every aspect of the design and implementation of Microsoft Windows was influenced in some way by the stringent requirements of providing robust security.
Having software, including operating systems, rated against well-defined standards helps the government, corporations, and home users protect proprietary and personal data stored in computer systems. The current security rating standard used by the United States and many other countries is the Common Criteria (CC). To understand the security capabilities designed into Windows, however, it’s useful to know the history of the security ratings system that influenced the design of Windows, the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC).
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) was established in 1981 as part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) National Security Agency (NSA). One goal of the NCSC was to create a range of security ratings, listed in Table 6-1, to be used to indicate the degree of protection commercial operating systems, network components, and trusted applications offer. These security ratings, which can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/dod85.pdf, were defined in 1983 and are commonly referred to as “the Orange Book.”
The TCSEC standard consists of “levels of trust” ratings, where higher levels build on lower levels by adding more rigorous protection and validation requirements. No operating system meets the A1, or “Verified Design,” rating. Although a few operating systems have earned one of the B-level ratings, C2 is considered sufficient and the highest rating practical for a general-purpose operating system.
Table 6-1 TCSEC Rating Levels
Labeled Security Protection
Controlled Access Protection
Discretionary Access Protection (obsolete)
In July 1995, Windows NT 3.5 (Workstation and Server) with Service Pack 3 was the first version of Windows NT to earn the C2 rating. In March 1999, Windows NT 4 with Service Pack 3 achieved an E3 rating from the U.K. government’s Information Technology Security (ITSEC) organization, a rating equivalent to a U.S. C2 rating. In November 1999, Windows NT 4 with Service Pack 6a earned a C2 rating in both stand-alone and networked configurations.
The following were the key requirements for a C2 security rating, and they are still considered the core requirements for any secure operating system:
A secure logon facility, which requires that users can be uniquely identified and that they must be granted access to the computer only after they have been authenticated in some way.
Discretionary access control, which allows the owner of a resource (such as a file) to determine who can access the resource and what they can do with it. The owner grants rights that permit various kinds of access to a user or to a group of users.
Security auditing, which affords the ability to detect and record security-related events or any attempts to create, access, or delete system resources. Logon identifiers record the identities of all users, making it easy to trace anyone who performs an unauthorized action.
Object reuse protection, which prevents users from seeing data that another user has deleted or from accessing memory that another user previously used and then released. For example, in some operating systems, it’s possible to create a new file of a certain length and then examine the contents of the file to see data that happens to have occupied the location on the disk where the file is allocated. This data might be sensitive information that was stored in another user’s file but had been deleted. Object reuse protection prevents this potential security hole by initializing all objects, including files and memory, before they are allocated to a user.
Windows also meets two requirements of B-level security:
Trusted path functionality, which prevents Trojan horse programs from being able to intercept users’ names and passwords as they try to log on. The trusted path functionality in Windows comes in the form of its Ctrl+Alt+Delete logon-attention sequence, which cannot be intercepted by nonprivileged applications. This sequence of keystrokes, which is also known as the secure attention sequence (SAS), always displays a system-controlled Windows security screen (if a user is already logged on) or the logon screen so that would-be Trojan horses can easily be recognized. (The secure attention sequence can also be sent programmatically via the SendSAS API, if group policy allows it.) A Trojan horse presenting a fake logon dialog box will be bypassed when the SAS is entered.
Trusted facility management, which requires support for separate account roles for administrative functions. For example, separate accounts are provided for administration (Administrators), user accounts charged with backing up the computer, and standard users.
Windows meets all of these requirements through its security subsystem and related components.
The Common Criteria
In January 1996, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and the Netherlands released the jointly developed Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE) security evaluation specification. CCITSE, which is usually referred to as the Common Criteria (CC), is the recognized multinational standard for product security evaluation. The CC home page is at www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme/.
The CC is more flexible than the TCSEC trust ratings and has a structure closer to the ITSEC standard than to the TCSEC standard. The CC includes the concept of a Protection Profile (PP), used to collect security requirements into easily specified and compared sets, and the concept of a Security Target (ST), which contains a set of security requirements that can be made by reference to a PP. The CC also defines a range of seven Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), which indicate a level of confidence in the certification. In this way, the CC (like the ITSEC standard before it) removes the link between functionality and assurance level that was present in TCSEC and earlier certification schemes.
Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Vista Enterprise all achieved Common Criteria certification under the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP). This is roughly equivalent to a TCSEC C2 rating. All received a rating of EAL 4+, the “plus” denoting “flaw remediation.” EAL 4 is the highest level recognized across national boundaries.
In March 2011, Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 were evaluated as meeting the requirements of the US Government Protection Profile for General-Purpose Operating Systems in a Networked Environment, version 1.0, 30 August 2010 (GPOSPP) (http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp_gpospp_v1.0.pdf). The certification includes the Hyper-V hypervisor, and again Windows achieved Evaluation Assurance Level 4 with flaw remediation (EAL-4+). The validation report can be found at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/st_vid10390-vr.pdf, and the description of the security target, giving details of the requirements satisfied, can be found at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/st_vid10390-st.pdf.